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ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the accuracy of budget forecasts in Turkey. Data 
is based on 23 years’ forecasted and materialized general budget revenues and 
outlays, from 1981 to 2003. One sample statistics, tabulated, and one sample t tests 
are applied to find out the accuracy of forecasting and the results show that there are 
statistically significant forecast errors and this significance, especially, indicates 
biases towards under-forecasting of outlays and over-forecasting of revenues. 
 
Keywords: Budget forecasting, budgeting. forecast error. 
 
ÖZET: Bu çalıma ile Türkiye’de bütçe tahminlerinin doruluu analiz 
edilmektedir. 1981-2003 dönemine ait 23 yıl için kullanılan veri, gelir ve 
harcamalara ilikin tahmin edilen ve gerçekleen genel bütçe verilerine 
dayanmaktadır. Tek örnek istatistii ve tek örnek t testi kullanılarak bütçe 
tahminlerinin doruluu aratırılmaktadır. Elde edilen ampirik bulgular bütçe 
tahminlerinde tahmin hataları yapıldıını ve bu hataların istatistiksel olarak gelir 
tahminlerinde fazla gelir tahminine, harcama tahminlerinde ise düük harcama 
tahminine yönelik bir eilim olduu eklindedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bütçe tahmini, bütçeleme, tahmin hatası. 
 
1. Introduction 
Outcome of forecasted budget, which is called materialized budget, must be 
important for budget-makers as this seems to be the criteria for them to testimony 
how they successfully implement their policies. Budget forecasting, however, has 
systematic as well as complex procedure that requires knowledge based on 
experience, access to information including information on the impact of economic, 
political and institutional factors (See”, for example, Bahl, 1980; and Bretschneider 
& Gorr, 1987), collaboration, probability of uncertainties, etc. All those have some 
degrees of effects on the outcome that eventually comes out with accurate/inaccurate 
revenue and outlay forecasts. To get accurately forecasted budget, budget-makers 
must, therefore, consider all these during the forecasting. 
 
By accuracy, it does not mean that forecasted budget revenues and outlays must 
solely be equal to the outcomes. There would likely be some degrees of variations 
between forecasted budget and its outcome that must be taken reasonably 
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acceptable.1 It is however expected that the budget-makers pay enough attention on 
the forecasting to catch as small variations as possible between their forecasted and 
materialized budgets. Otherwise, the failure in accuracy might easily and cheaply be 
attributed to themselves (Badigen, 2002:30). 
 
With budget forecasting, there are two main assumptions that can be summarized as 
follows. In the outlay side of the budget, it may be supposed that accuracy in 
forecasting was achieved. In this case, it is in probability to derive one of three 
results with regard to forecasted and materialized revenues: Revenue was over-
forecasted or under-forecasted or accurately forecasted. If the budget materialized 
with over-forecasted revenue, serious problems would become inevitable. Because 
revenues inadequately materialized, either there must be some cuts in spending or 
search for new resources to finance all the approved spendings (Schoeder, 
1982:122). In the case of under-forecasted revenue, there would not be any serious 
problem providing taxpayers did not interpret government as levying taxes 
excessively (Vasche and Williams, 1987). In the case of accurately forecasted 
revenue, the outcome clarifies budget-makers as they had forecasted revenues 
accurately. 
 
Disregarding the above assumption, it may also be supposed that accuracy was 
achieved in forecasting of budget revenue. In this case, it is also in probability to 
derive one of three results for the forecasted and materialized outlays. Outlay was 
over-forecasted or under-forecasted or accurately forecasted. If the budget 
materialized with over-forecasted outlays, there would be some excess resources  
that were not needed during the budget year. In the case of under-forecasted outlay, 
the budget-makers would face to serious consequences; searching for new resources, 
midcourse adjustments in forecasted outlays, or financing outlays by debt that would 
eventually cause budget deficits. In the case of accurately forecasted outlay, there 
would be no criticism on budget-makers. 
 
The focus of this paper is to analyze the accuracy of budget forecasting for revenues 
and outlays in Turkey. For this purpose, 23 years period, from 1981 to 2003 
financial years’ budgetary data are used to statistically analyze budget forecast 
variations2 and forecast errors3. Statistical tools used are simple statistics; one 
sample statistics and one sample t test. 
 
                                                 
1
 The extent to which we take the degrees of variation as reasonable can only be analyzed 
through some statistical techniques that are applied in the empirical section of this study. 
2
 Budget forecast variation, BFV, is defined as differences between the budget outcome and 
the forecasted budget expressed as the percentage of budget outcome for the previous year 
and can be formulated as (Australian National Audit Office, 1999). 
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3
 Forecast error, FE, can be defined as difference between the budget outcome and the 
forecasted budget expressed as the percentage of budget outcome and can be formulated as 
(Badigen, 2002:32). 
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2. The Scope of Budget Forecasting 
Budget is a tool of governments –rolling party or parties– to indirectly express the 
will of their citizenry. It might simple be defined as a forecast of revenues and 
outlays that citizenry expected for a given period. The forecast represents both a 
level of goods and services that will publicly be provided and means of finance. Any 
variation from the forecast will denote a difference between what was agreed on and 
what has materialized. 
 
Budgeting is also a political tool and has inherently political process in which it is 
up to the politicians’ preferences to decide on which variables to be put into the 
forecast. Earlier studies put different variables into their analysis to improve their 
models to get accurate forecasting (See, for example, Kliesen and Thornton, 2001; 
Auerbach, 1999; Williams et al., 1999; Mayper et al., 1991; Bretschneider and Gorr, 
1987; Bahl, 1980; and Granof, 1978). Some of those variable that were expected to 
have important effects on the outcome of budget forecasts can be given as economic 
growth, inflation, unemployment, world economic growth, household income, 
change in population, and political stability. 
 
This study does not however focus on the way of making accurate budget 
forecasting or to find out what factors are associated with budget forecast variations, 
BFV. Whatever affects budget forecasting, we expect the forecasters, budget-
makers, are able to perfectly consider all of them and able to take into account all 
the necessary variables effecting their forecast. From this point of view, this study is 
an attempt to elucidate how successfully revenues and outlays were forecasted in 
Turkish case. 
 
It is supposed that if there are obvious forecast errors that would likely be caused by 
poor forecast effort of the budget-makers, it will be then some accusations targeted 
to the failure of budget-makers. Kind of those accusations would be as: 
 
a) They deliberately underestimate/overestimate revenues/outlays to live enough 
room for themselves to deal with unanticipated shortages. 
b) They deliberately overestimate/underestimate revenues/outlays to prevent from 
potential reactions of citizenry that would put in force before the operation of the 
budget providing they were earlier informed about the potential budget deficit, tax 
increases, etc. 
 
Though there would be many reasons behind the last assumption, we take two of 
those that must be expressed. Firstly, it indicates that budget-makers act cautiously 
so that the outcome would not be as what were forecasted earlier in the proposed 
budget. The budget-makers would probably not want to take the risk of citizenry’s 
reaction at the beginning of budget forecast. They might want to disperse towards 
the midcourse of the budgetary operation by living some enough rooms to maneuver 
with midcourse amendments. Secondly, for the year budget being prepared, there 
would be election eve and budget-makers might act intentionally so that they can get 
more vote through the contents of the budget prepared in the line with what citizenry 
expect.  
 
From these two main assumptions, the study empirically analyzes to answer to the 
following hypotheses: 
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Null-hypothesis: Forecasted budget revenue and outlay are equal to materialized 
budget revenue and outlay. 
H0: µ =0 Forecast errors, FEs, for revenue and outlay are equal to zero. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Budget-makers cannot accurately forecast revenues; FEs always 
occur. 
H1: µ ≠ 0 FEs for revenues are not equal to zero, i.e. revenues are over or under- 
forecasted. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Budget-makers cannot accurately forecast outlays; FEs always occur. 
H2: µ ≠ 0 FEs for outlays are not equal to zero, i.e. outlays are over or under-
forecasted. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Budget-makers cautiously act towards over-forecasting revenues. 
H3: µ  < 0 FEs for revenues are smaller than zero, i.e. revenues are over-forecasted 
 
Hypothesis 4: Budget-makers cautiously act towards under-forecasting outlays. 
H4: µ  > 0 FEs for outlays are bigger than zero, i.e. outlays are under-forecasted. 
 
To answer to these assumptions, we use the method of BFV by the Audit Report of 
Australian National Audit Office (1999) and the method of FE by Rodgers and 
Joyce (1996) and Badigen (2002). BFV can simply be expressed as the percentage 
of budget forecast variation with regard to the previous year’s outcome. Findings of 
this analysis will show the extent to which forecast variation occurred. FE provides 
answer to whether the budget-makers did accurately forecast budgetary outlays and 
revenues. 
 
3. Description of the Data 
The study was limited to the data of general budget. The period taken into account is 
from 1981 to 2003 financial year. In the year 2001, there happened economic crises 
that had really caused obvious amendments in the budget. As a result of this, initial 
FE for the year 2001 was enormously big. To eliminate effects of the crises on the 
budget, we did not take the initially forecasted budget but rather the forecasted 
budget that was stated just after the crises. 
 
The data used in this study is obtained from State Institute of Statistics (2001), 
General Directorate of Revenues (2004), and General Directorate of Public 
Accounts (2004). 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Comparisons of forecasted budgets and their outcomes 
In this section, it is firstly analyzed the extent to which BFVs and FEs occurred for 
the years 1981-2003. Mean budget forecast variations, MBFVs, and mean forecast 
errors, MFEs, are also taken into account to see statistical significance of BFVs and 
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FEs. Then, absolute forecast errors, AFEs and absolute budget forecast variations, 
ABFVs, put into the analysis disregarding the directions4 of variations. 
Table 1 represents both FEs and AFEs for forecasted revenues and outlays. It also 
gives difference of absolute FEs obtained by subtracting FEs of revenues from FEs 
of outlays. Error ratios with negative sign indicate over-forecasted budgets and 
ratios with positive sign indicate under-forecasted budgets. The last two rows in the 
table show mean FEs and standard deviations, SDs, respectively. 
 
In the table; 
• support for the null-hypotheses, H0, will be obtained if the FEs are zero. 
• support for the hypotheses H1 and H2 will be obtained if the FEs are different 
than zero, having either negative or positive signs. 
• support for the hypothesis H3/H4 is obtained if the signs of FEs’ for 
outlay/revenue were, in general, negative/positive. 
 
Table 1. Budget Forecast Errors, 1981-2003 (%) 
   REVENUE   OUTLAYS 
Year 
      FE 
      (1) 
     AFE 
      (2) 
     FE 
      (3) 
    AFE 
     (4) 
Difference 
 of FEs 
 [1-3] 
  (5) 
1981 -2.60 2.60 -0.10 0.10 -2.50  
1982 -13.18 13.18 -7.61 7.61 -5.57  
1983 -1.65 1.65 7.70 7.70 -9.35  
1984 -5.05 5.05 23.04 23.04 -28.09  
1985 5.60 5.60 6.15 6.15 -0.55  
1986 -7.16 7.16 9.20 9.20 -16.35  
1987 -10.02 10.02 10.88 10.88 -20.90  
1988 -23.16 23.16 -1.64 1.64 -21.52  
1989 -8.35 8.35 13.29 13.29 -21.64  
1990 -16.09 16.09 2.84 2.84 -18.92  
1991 -9.18 9.18 18.59 18.59 -27.76  
1992 -19.17 19.17 5.30 5.30 -24.47  
1993 -13.64 13.64 17.64 17.64 -31.28  
1994 -10.90 10.90 7.22 7.22 -18.11  
1995 -1.10 1.10 22.29 22.29 -23.38  
1996 1.67 1.67 10.60 10.60 -8.93  
1997 -8.92 8.92 21.96 21.96 -30.89  
1998 7.53 7.53 4.64 4.64 2.89  
1999 3.79 3.79 2.79 2.79 1.00  
2000 1.76 1.76 -0.44 0.44 2.20  
2001 4.19 4.19 -2.42 2.42 6.61  
2002 4.94 4.94 14.90 14.90 -9.96  
2003 -1.82 1.82 -4.33 4.33 2.50  
                                                 
4
 The direction of BFV or FE can either have negative or positive sign. If the sign is positive, 
this denotes that budget forecast under-forecasted and if the sign is negative, this denotes 
vice versa. 
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   REVENUE   OUTLAYS 
Year 
      FE 
      (1) 
     AFE 
      (2) 
     FE 
      (3) 
    AFE 
     (4) 
Difference 
 of FEs 
 [1-3] 
  (5) 
Mean -5.33 7.89 7.93 9.37 -13.26  
Std. Dev. 8.43 5.97 8.87 7.26 12.22  
Note: FE and AFE indicate Forecast Error and Absolute Forecast Errors respectively. 
 
Taking the findings in Table 1 into account all the FEs for revenue had, firstly, 
occurred different than zero; 7 out of 23 FEs have positive sign and the rest 
negative. This statistically supports our first hypothesis, H1, and rejects the null-
hypothesis of perfect revenue forecasting. With 16 out of 23 negative signed FEs, 
the hypothesis H3 of over-forecasted revenue cannot also be rejected. 
 
Secondly, all the FEs for outlays had occurred different than zero; 6 out of 23 FEs 
have negative sign, while the rest positive. This finding, also, statistically supports 
the assumption of budget-makers cannot accurately forecast outlays, H2. The density 
of positive sing, with 17 out of 23, has statistically importance to state that during 
the period we analyzed budget-makers under-forecasted outlays, therefore we cannot 
reject the hypothesis H4. 
 
Table 2 shows budget forecast variations for revenues and outlays and actual budget 
deficits. 
 
Table 2. Budget Forecast Variations, 1981-2003 (%) 
     REVENUE OUTLAYS 
Year 
      FV 
       (1) 
      
AFV 
      (2) 
       FV 
        (3) 
    AFV 
     (4) 
   Actual 
   
Budget 
   Deficit 
     (5) 
1981 -3.98 3.98 -0.14 0.14 6.65 
1982 -13.84 13.84 -8.18 8.18 9.16 
1983 -2.74 2.74 12.95 12.95 10.78 
1984 -6.15 6.15 34.55 34.55 36.50 
1985 10.51 10.51 8.50 8.50 0.58 
1986 -8.27 8.27 12.48 12.48 18.01 
1987 -14.95 14.95 16.98 16.98 23.45 
1988 -39.35 39.35 -2.73 2.73 21.17 
1989 -15.01 15.01 24.62 24.62 24.96 
1990 -29.32 29.32 4.94 4.94 19.47 
1991 -16.06 16.06 36.51 36.51 34.10 
1992 -34.64 34.64 8.99 8.99 25.84 
1993 -27.48 27.48 38.96 38.96 37.98 
1994 -23.06 23.06 13.23 13.23 19.52 
1995 -2.05 2.05 42.81 42.81 22.85 
1996 3.24 3.24 24.36 24.36 45.86 
1997 -19.03 19.03 44.83 44.83 39.58 
1998 15.29 15.29 8.97 8.97 32.92 
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     REVENUE OUTLAYS 
Year 
      FV 
       (1) 
      
AFV 
      (2) 
       FV 
        (3) 
    AFV 
     (4) 
   Actual 
   
Budget 
   Deficit 
     (5) 
1999 6.08 6.08 5.03 5.03 49.22 
2000 3.11 3.11 -0.73 0.73 40.38 
2001 6.45 6.45 -4.19 4.19 57.57 
2002 7.24 7.24 21.37 21.37 54.10 
2003 -2.41 2.41 -5.25 5.25 41.53 
Mean -8.98 13.49 14.73 16.58 29.23 
Std. Dev. 14.98 10.88 16.15 14.16 15.38 
Note: FV and AFV indicate Forecast Variation and Absolute Forecast Variation respectively. 
 
Similar results as the above can also be observed in Table 2. To consider accuracy of 
budget forecasting, the direction of error, i.e. the sign, is not necessary, but existence 
of BFVs. As accurate forecasting can be explained with no BFV, i.e. the ratio is 
equal to zero, we can therefore check out the extent to which whether budget-makers 
had BFVs during the sample period. Looking at the column FV for revenue, one can 
observe that budget-makers could not be successful in forecasting revenues with 
zero variation, even not close to zero. Taking, for example, 1982 financial year into 
account, revenue FV occurred as %13.84, indicating to over-forecasted revenue. 
Similar result can also be observed for the ratios of FE for revenue in Table 1, i.e. 
13.18 per cent over-forecasted revenue.  
 
In terms of Turkish currency, revenue was initially forecasted as 1,715,640 Million 
TL, but materialized as 1,515,800 Million TL with the difference of 199,840 Million 
TL of revenue shortages (State Institute of Statistics, 2001:521). As a result of no 
accurate forecasting, general budget for the year 1982 materialized with a deficit of 
138,910 Million TL. This deficit indicates 9.16 per cent budget FE caused by 13.18 
per cent of over-forecasted revenue and 7.61 per cent of over-forecasted outlay (See 
Table 1 for the year 1982). More obvious and similar results can also be observed 
for the other observed years, excluding the year 1985. 
 
Looking at the year 1985’s budget deficit, it seems that budget-makers had accurate 
forecasting with the ratio of 0.58 per cent deficit. However, this ratio is based on 
overall budget result. Considering budget variations with regard to revenue and 
outlay separately, it is obvious that there are 10.51 per cent budget variation for 
revenue and 8.50 per cent budget variation for outlay. That means budget-makers 
could not succeed to forecast revenue and outlay accurately. This shows that relative 
variations, even small variation in forecasted and materialized budgets by taking 
forecasted and materialized revenues and outlays separately, can have quite 
significant impact on the accuracy of the forecasting and impact on the budget 
balance.  
 
Comparing these findings with Table 1, mean absolute forecast error, MAFE, for 
revenues materialized as 7.89 per cent, indicating that, for the sample period, the 
average revenue FE is 7.89 per cent misestimated. Since the SD for this period is 
5.97, which is less than the MAFE of 7.89, one may conclude that the absolute error 
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could reflect deliberate bias. MAFE for outlays, on the other hand, materialized with 
9.37 per cent, which is larger than the SD as 7.26, i.e. forecasted outlays do also 
reflect deliberate bias of budget-makers. 
 
4.2. Analysis of Forecast Errors 
In this section, one sample statistics and one sample t test are used to statistically 
analyze the hypotheses. Figure 1 outlines FEs for revenue and outlays from 1981 to 
2003. A FE below zero indicates that the budget revenue or outlays has over-
forecasted and a FE above zero indicates vice versa. An accurate forecast must be 
equal to materialized revenue or outlay that is, in the figure, shown with the line 
across zero5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Forecast Errors for Revenue and Outlay, 1981-2003 
 
The figure exposes an inclination toward over-forecasting for budget revenues and 
under-forecasting for the outlays. For the revenues, it was over-forecasted for 16 out 
of 23 years and under-forecasted for 7 out of 23 years. For the outlays, it was over-
forecasted for 4 out of 23 years and under-forecasted for 19 out of 23 years. 
Comparing MFEs for both revenues and outlays for the period studied, it is obvious 
that the MFE for revenues is smaller than the MFE for outlays; the value of MFE for 
revenues is -5.33 and the value of MFE for outlays is 7.93 (see Table 1). 
 
Figure 2 shows AFEs for both revenues and outlays. In this figure, we are only 
interested in absolute magnitudes of the FEs and therefore directions of FEs are 
disregarded. Any FE, for either revenue or outlay, over or under the zero line is 
taken as the FE that we do not need here to know its sing but its magnitude. Our 
interest rather here is to focus on whether budget-makers had statistically significant 
FE or not. If the magnitude of FE is equal, or close, to zero, that means there does 
not occur budget FE for that year, i.e. revenues or outlays were perfectly forecasted. 
 
                                                 
5
 Hereafter it is called ‘zero line’. 
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Figure 2. Absolute Forecast Error for Revenue and Outlay, 1981-2003 
 
Disregarding small deviations in Figure 2, i.e. deviations close to zero –say up to 2 
per cent, it is seen that revenues for 18 out of 23 years and outlays for 20 out of 23 
years were mis-forecasted; there is no accuracy in forecasting for the sample period. 
MAFE appears as 7.89 for revenues and as 7.93 for outlays. 
 
Figure 3 gives us combined FEs of revenue and outlay; i.e. FEs for overall budget. 
 
 
Figure 3. Budget Forecast Errors, 1981-2003 
 
In Figure 3, the values are obtained by subtracting FEs for outlays from the FEs for 
revenues. Over/under-forecasts in both revenue and outlay offset budget FEs 
towards the zero line, while over/under-forecasts in revenues and under/over-
forecasts in outlays remove budget FE at somewhere far away from the zero line. 
Taking, for example, the values for the year 1984 into account in Table 1, the value 
of -5.05 per cent FE for revenue is subtracted from the value of 23.04 per cent FE 
for outlay and obtained the value of -28.09 per cent of general budget FE. 
 
For the period analyzed here, it seems obvious that budget-makers had major FEs 
with the value of 14.58 MFE and the value of 10.53 SD. Disregarding small 
deviations close to zero, it is shown in Figure 3 that the majority, 21 out of 23, of the 
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period budgets were mis-forecasted; no accuracy is found for budget forecasts in the 
period, exception with the years 1985 and 1999. In 1985 and 1999 budgets were 
forecasted with FEs close to zero, i.e. 0.55 and 1.00 per cent of FEs respectively. 
 
4.3. One Sample t Test 
In this section, it is analyzed to find out whether MFEs differs from the specified 
constant of zero at the 95% confidence level. Since the accuracy is determined with 
no forecast error, any difference of MFEs, either with negative or positive, will let 
us to reject the null-hypothesis of accurate forecasting. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of one sample statistics and t tests of FEs for both 
revenues and outlays. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. One-Sample T test 
One Sample Statistics One-Sample Test 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
tcal 
Signifi
-cance 
Lower Upper 
FE
 
-5.33 8.43 1.76 -3.03 .006 -8.972 
-
1.681 
R
EV
EN
U
E 
Absolut
e 
FE
 
7.93 8.87 1.85 4.29 .000 4.096 11.771 
FE
 
7.89 5.97 1.25 6.34 .000 5.308 10.472 
O
U
TL
A
Y
 
Absolut
e 
FE
 
9.37 7.26 1.51 6.19 .000 6.232 12.512 
Note: degrees of freedom (df): 22. 
 
In Table 3, it is, firstly, analyzed to find answer to whether the null-hypothesis H0 of 
revenue and outlay are equal to zero is accepted. With 22 degrees of freedom6, df, 
and at 0.05 significance level7, since the tabulated, ttab8, value of 2.079 is small than 
the calculated, tcal, values of -3.03, 4.29, 6.34, and 6.19, H0 cannot statistically be 
accepted. In other words, MFEs made during the sample period is far away from 
                                                 
6
 Degrees of freedom (df) = (n – 1). 
7
 Hereafter, all the statistical results were obtained with 22 degrees of freedom and at 0.05 
significance level. 
8
 It denotes to critical value that is the value of a test statistic at or beyond the rejection of null 
hypothesis. It is the actual score that cuts off the lowest 5% of the distribution that is called 
the critical value. 
9
 It is taken from the ‘Percentage Points of the t Distribution Table. 
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zero, i.e. at a 95 per cent confidence interval, the MFEs of revenues and outlays do 
not fall inside the calculated confidence intervals. 
 
Secondly, one sample t test is applied to test hypothesis H1 of revenues are over or 
under-forecasted. The test result shows that since the ttab value of 2.07 is less than 
the tcal value of 4.29, H1 cannot statistically be rejected, i.e. revenues are over or 
under-forecasted; large difference occurs between the MFE value of 7.93 and 
accurate budget forecast value of zero.  
 
Regarding the hypothesis H3 of revenues are over-forecasted, the MFE value of -
5.33 is bigger than the ttab value of 1.72.10; i.e. the hypothesis H3 cannot statistically 
be rejected. 
 
Regarding the hypothesis H2 of outlays are over or under-forecasted, since the ttab 
value of 2.07 is less than the tcal value of 6.19, the assumption of outlays are over or 
under-forecasted cannot statistically be rejected. In other words, the MFE value of 
9.37 is far away from the value of zero. 
 
In terms of the hypothesis H4 of outlays are under-forecasted, as a result of the 
statistical results showing the ttab value of 1.72 is less than the tcal value of 6.34, H4 
cannot statistically be rejected. Once again, the MFE value of 7.89 is far away from 
the perfect forecast value of zero. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper statistically analyzed accuracy of general budget forecasting in Turkey 
for the sample period 1981-2003. As statistical tool, tabulated, one sample statistics 
and one sample t test are applied to test the two main assumptions of there is no 
accuracy for budget forecasting and revenues/outlays are deliberately over/under-
forecasted. The data based on both forecasted and materialized general budget 
revenues and outlays. 
 
Regarding the first assumption, statistical results have shown that, during the sample 
period, there is no accuracy in budget forecasting, neither for revenue nor for 
outlays. The budget-makers had significantly made FEs that are bigger than the 
value of zero. The findings of one sample t tests also showed that over-forecasting 
for revenues and under-forecasting for outlays are statistically significant 
 
From these findings it can be concluded that budget-makers had acted cautiously in 
budget forecasting in a way that their forecasts are deliberately biased; outlays had 
been purposefully under-forecasted so as not to stand against the will of citizenry’s 
less tax payment, while revenues had been over-forecasted so as initially to make 
balanced budget. Outlays were then, during the midcourse of each financial year, 
amended to spend more. Unfortunately, they were not able to amend revenues in 
terms of rising taxes, but applying borrowing. 
 
Overall, inaccurate forecasts in budget revenues and outlays were occurred during 
the period and the implication of this study is that budget-makers might pay some 
                                                 
10
 Since the hypothesis three assumes that revenues are over-forecasted, one the direction of 
error sign is considered. Hence, the ttab value is taken as one-tailed. 
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attentions on the magnitudes of the FE ratios so that the accuracy in budgeting 
would be achieved in the future. 
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